Passive Supporters of Terrorism and Phase Transitions by August, Friedrich et al.
Abstract
We discuss some social contagion processes to describe the formation and
spread of radical opinions in the spirit of previous work by Serge Galam. The
dynamics of opinion spread involves local threshold processes as well as mean
field effects. We calculate and observe phase transitions in the dynamical vari-
ables resulting in a rapidly increasing number of passive supporters. This strongly
indicates that military solutions are inappropriate.
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1 Introduction
In this article we discuss some social contagion processes which may play an important
role in the dynamics of radical opinion formation. The prime applications in mind are
conflict situations as they are met at the time of writing in Afghanistan, Iraq or Pales-
tine where a highly armed alliance of foreign troops fights against a part of the local
population which has been radicalized in a way such that western social classification
dubs them terrorists. In the following we will use the word ”terrorist” solely to refer
to a certain subpopulation (whose interaction features will be described below) in our
model environment and do not intend to enter the difficult debate of what constitutes
the social essence of terrorism. In terms of our model interaction and shortly speak-
ing one could say that terrorists are those individuals on which counter terrorist throw
bombs on.
Besides the radical terrorist groups there is a much larger grey-area of supporters of
these terrorists. Support has many faces, ranging from just keeping still about what one
knows about terrorists locations or movements up to supporting terrorists by providing
various forms of logistic infrastructure. Again, we will avoid specifying exactly what
is meant with this notion but use it to describe the potential, predecessor states of an
opinion state from which radical groups may (by whatever means and tools) recruit
new members.
The notion of passive supporters was for the first time used in the context of mathemat-
ical modeling by Serge Galam in [2],[3],[4]. He studied the role of passive supporters
in a lattice percolation type model and related terrorism power to the spontaneous for-
mation of random backbones of people who are sympathetic to terrorism but without
being directly involved in it. His focus was on the correlation between the number of
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passive supporters, the physical mobility of active terrorists and phase transitions asso-
ciated with it. In a certain sense the present work is a continuation of Galams work on
the subject.We arrive at similar conclusions as Galam did, namely that for these type
of conflicts military solutions are inappropriate.
In this paper we discuss some aspects of the dynamics of passive support of terrorist
activities in virtual social networks. Our main interest lies in the study of phase tran-
sitions in the number of passive supporters induced by what is euphemistically called
collateral damage as is common as a consequence of counter terrorist attacks on ter-
rorists moving around in populated places. Phase transitions in the opinion of large
parts of a population are particularly important since they violate the classical ”linear”
action-reaction view common among military leaders and politicians.
We are not concerned with real terrorist networks and their dynamics, for a recent work
on this topic see [1] and the references therein. Our model is based on one paradigm.
Counter terrorist strikes lead to collateral damage. In many cases terrorists live or
hide among civilians, and civilian casualties in turn are likely to cause an increase in
the number of passive supporters3 and increase the willingness of civilians to become
members of radical groups.
Cause and effect are not linearly coupled, there is a phase transition instead. It was
widely believed among western observers that in Afghanistan a large part of the pop-
ulation was supporting the Allied forces at the beginning of the operation, in spite of
many casualties caused by bombings and other military strikes. Then a change in the
public opinion seems to have occurred, the atmosphere inclined to the disadvantage of
the allied forces and a transition from Allied-friendly to Taliban-friendly took place,
causing a boost in the number of passive supporters.
Passive supporters usually do not reveal their nature towards outsiders and such phase
transitions are hardly observable by Allied forces. The number of passive supporters
can only be measured indirectly via the degree of cooperation of the civil population. If
the fraction of passive supporters in a population becomes large it is likely that counter
terrorists face increased difficulties to gain help and support from civilians. Further
the recruiting pool for radical organizations can become nearly inexhaustible, as it has
been popularized in News reports about the Gaza Strip. Such a situation may result in
an absurd and tragic solution to secure public safety and to avoid a downward spiral of
violence, like the segregation of people from each other with a fence.
2 Description of the Model
In the following we will specify the structure of our model which is inspired by gen-
eralized epidemic processes (for more information about this class of processes and
some other applications see [5]). Let G = (V,E) be a graph on a finite set of vertices
V, representing our model population, and a set of edges E encoding the social con-
tacts relevant for transmissions. We start with the description of the state space of the
vertices. To keep things simple we distinguish only four states S = {0, 1, 2, 3}. State
0 encodes the members of the susceptible population which are more or less neutral
3at least in the local family and friendship network of a civilian victim this is highly plausible
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Figure 1: Coalition military casualties in Afghanistan by month: Neglecting seasonal
effects, the sudden increase in the number of casualties is very similar to the density of
active terrorists in figures 3, 4 and 5, caused by the phase transition in the density of
passive supporters. Source of diagram: http://www.icasualties.org/oef/
in their opinion about terrorists. State 1 individuals correspond to the passive support-
ers of terrorism and state 2 encodes active terrorists. State 3 vertices correspond to
vertices, which are isolated from the network and do not interact anymore with other
vertices. Although it would be natural, to consider more refined states we can restrict
the discussion of phase transitions to this rather simple setting by arguing that the type
of phase transition described here is robust to many refinements of the model.
There is usually an immune subpopulation which is resistant to any radical opinion
influence. Including this group will reduce the size of the susceptible population but
does not influence the existence of phase transitions. Also there usually exist dynamics
within the terrorist groups in complex hierarchical networks which in turn may have
a strong influence on terrorists activities (see [1]). These intrinsic network dynamics
within the relatively small subpopulation of terrorists have only marginal influence on
the 0 − 1 transition process (the process of becoming a passive supporter via a social
contagion process).
The dynamics will be defined via two transition probabilities Ploc and Pmean, where
Ploc depends on the state distribution in the neighborhood of a vertex and Pmean corre-
sponds to a mean field term depending on the overall prevalence of the state variables at
a given time t. Although mesoscopic dependencies are in principle possible, we think
they are of secondary importance and do not change the dynamical picture in general.
With χi(t) denoting the state variable of individual i at time t, for the probability of
switching the state from a to b we formally have:
P{χi(t+1) = b | χi(t) = a} = Ploc
(
χB1(i)(t), b
)⊕Pmean (s(t), a, b) ; a, b ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
3
where the sum sign stands for independent superposition4 of the local and global in-
fection events. The subscript B1(i) denotes the neighborhood of i and s(t) the total
number (or density) of vertices not in a susceptible or immune state at time t.
The local dynamics we use here is inspired by generalized epidemic processes [5]. In
classical epidemics, the probability of infection is an independent superposition of the
single infection events caused by each infected neighbor (for small infection proba-
bilities this means that the probability to get infected is proportional to the number of
infected neighbors). In generalized epidemic processes to every vertex i is assigned
a threshold ∆i of infected neighbors, at which the probability of infection suddenly
jumps to a high probability. More precisely, let Ni(t) denote the number of neighbors
of a susceptible individual i at time t which support or accomplish terrorism. Hence
Ni(t) is the sum of state 1 and state 2 neighbors of i at time t. Then, the probability
that individual i will become a passive supporter at time t+ 1 is given by:
Ploc {χi(t+ 1) = 1 | χi(t) = 0} =
{
Ni(t), Ni(t) < ∆i
α, Ni(t) ≥ ∆i
This type of local dynamics applies with appropriate modifications to many social pro-
cesses like the spread of rumors, prejudices, knowledge or beliefs. So, whenever one
vertex has contact with too many (here ∆ or more) passive supporters or terrorists, they
will sooner or later become passive supporters of the terrorists, either because they get
convinced by the ideology or because they get exploited, unintentionally or even un-
noted by themselves. Passive supporters as well as terrorists themselves may become
uncooperative or useless, so they discontinue support. We assume therefore that for ev-
ery vertex there is a chance of switching back from 1 or 2 to 0 with a given probability
γ.
Also there is a fixed rate κ at which terrorists recruit from passive supporters. Due to
the action of external forces like the state or allied troops, or by death or by migra-
tion, terrorists can be neutralized and removed from the network with probability ρ.
Emotionally involved relatives and friends of victims, who where in state 0 until then,
will potentially decide to join the terrorists side to take revenge. Civilians watching the
News may be upset and enraged when they observe counter terrorists taking out their
fellow citizens and destroying their buildings to capture or to eliminate terrorists.
We assume a fixed rate β at which a neutralized terrorist induces new passive supporters
via the previously described social processes. Thus, for a susceptible vertex in the
network, the probability of becoming a passive supporter depends (besides the above
describe local infection way) on the number of neutralized terrorist per time step and
therefore on the number of active terrorists in the network. In this way, β constitutes the
mean field dynamics of the infection process. If C(t) denotes the number of captured
terrorists at time t we have formally for the probability that a state 0 vertex changes its
state into 1 in the next time step:
Pmean {χi(t+ 1) = 1 | χi(t) = 0} = 1− (1− β)C(t) (1)
∼ βC (t) ; for small β. (2)
4Independent superposition of two probabilities A and B is just A+B −AB
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Note that if one ignores mass media effects the total number of new mean field induced
passive supporters should stay bounded irrespective of the size of the population (re-
flecting the fact that it is at most an effect on mesoscopic scale). We therefore scale the
β value with the population size appropriately.
Table 1 summarizes all parameters and their interpretations.
Table 1: Summary of all parameters
parameter transition affiliation
 0→ 1 local process below the threshold
α 0→ 1 local process above the threshold
β 0→ 1 mean field
γ 1, 2→ 0 changing mind
κ 1→ 2 procreation rate of new terrorists
ρ / neutralization rate of terrorists
3 Phase Transitions in the Local Infection Process
The usage of local threshold dynamics yields additional phase transitions that are dif-
ferent from those in classical epidemics, which are phase transitions in the parameters.
Here, in addition to these phase transitions in the parameters there are such in the dy-
namical variables like the number of passive supporters. In the following we state some
analytic results for these phase transitions for the case of the classical Erdı¨¿ 12 s&Renyi
random graph G(n, p), the graph with n vertices and independent edge probability p
between each pair of vertices.
To investigate the average infection density bt on a G(n, p) with p = c/n we assume
for simplicity  = 0, α = 1 and that the thresholds ∆i are distributed uniformly, i.e.
∆i = ∆ for all vertices i. It is easy to see that the case of very small  and rather large
α gives similar results although the formulas become more complicated. For a detailed
mathematical treatment see [5]. There is a recursion for bt, namely
bt+1 = 1− (1− b0)e−cbt
∆−1∑
k=0
(cbt)
k
k!
.
Thus, for ∆ = 2 we get for the fixed point equation
b∗ = 1− (1− b0) e−cb∗ (1 + cb∗) . (3)
Note that there can be several solutions one has to take the dynamically stable one
(closest to b0 ). A closer examination shows that, depending on the value of b0 and
c, there are either 3 fixed points or just one in the domain [0, 1]. Since the iteration
mapping has no critical points in this interval the smallest of these fixed point is also
the attractor for the orbit starting with b0. Three examples are shown below. The phase
transition happens when the first two fixed points (in case there are three) join together
and form an indifferent (slope one) fixed point, see fig. 3. That means that for b0 < bc0,
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Figure 2: Right hand side of eq 3 (top left, top right, lower left). The black lines point
to the stable fixed point. The graph in the lower right shows bc0 as a function of b0.
i.e. if the initial prevalence is smaller than the critical value, the final infection density
b∗ will be not much larger than b0. If b0 > bc0 then b
∗ will be close to the number
of vertices in the k-core5 of the graph. The phase transitions are closely connected
with the k-cores of a network. If k ≥ ∆ then every vertex in the k-core succeeds the
threshold and gets infected sooner or later.
The critical density bc0, depending on the edge density c of the graph, is given by
bc0 = 1−
2 exp(− 12 (1− c+
√
c2 − 2c− 3))
c(−1 + c−√c2 − 2c− 3)
Figure 2 shows the function of the right hand side of eq. 3.
The mean field dynamics described in section 2 induces now an effective slow increase
of the initial density for the local spreading process until the critical density for the
local dynamics is reached. Above the phase transition there remains then a nearly
inexhaustible pool for recruiting new terrorists and any attempt to resolve the situation
by military means has to fail. We close this section with a short calculation for the
pure mean field dynamics. Let κ be the probability that a passive supporter becomes
a terrorist (for the simulations this is taken to be 0.1 percent). Assume that n is large
and βn = B, Then the branching process approximation to the pure mean field process
5A subgraph G′ of a graph G is called k-core of G if every vertex in G′ has at least k neighbors.
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(which is valid for small numbers of initially infected) becomes overcritical if
κρB
(γ + κ(1− γ)) (γ + ρ(1− γ)) > 1. (4)
Note that in case the critical threshold for the local infection process is very small even
in the subcritical case the mean field dynamics can due to stochastic fluctuations trigger
the dynamics above to the phase transition.
4 Simulation Results
The simulations are run on an Erdı¨¿ 12 s&Renyi random graph G(n, p) in discrete time
and synchronous updates. Throughout all simulations the parameters of the local in-
fection process are chosen to be α = 1,  = 0. Note that the difference to a process
with transmission probability α = 0.5 would be just a small time delay. The remaining
parameters are chosen to be plausible if one interprets the time step to be one week
with the situation in Afghanistan in mind.
On average, one percent of the passive supporters change back to being susceptible,
γ = 0.01. The probability of becoming an active terrorist is zero for all susceptible
vertices and 0.1 percent for all passive supporters. Thus, on average 1000 passive
supporters generate one single terrorist.
On each picture the abscissa is time, where we - as was mentioned above - interpret
one time step ∆t = 1 to be one week. There are other associations possible of course,
but in the context of social networks in regions, which are struck by terror, associating
one time step with one week, giving people the opportunity to act and communicate,
seems to be a natural choice.
The y-axis is the density of vertices in state 1 or 2, thus having values running from
0 to 1. There are three graphs shown, the dark blue one being the number of active
terrorists, the dark green one being the number of passive supporters and the turquoise
one being the sum of these two.
Figure 3 shows the case of an Erdı¨¿ 12 s-Renyi random graph G(n, p), p = c/n with
n = 200′000 and and average degree of c = 4. The threshold for the local dynamics is
set to ∆ = 2, i.e. as soon as one vertex has two passive supporters in its neighborhood
it turns to a passive supporter as well. The initial density of passive supporters is set
to b0 = 0.04, i.e. there are 8000 passive supporters from the start. The mean field
parameter β, which is the rate at which one captured active terrorist generates passive
supporters, is set to β = 0.00001, i.e. one captured active terrorist generates on average
2 passive supporters.
The process is run for a span of t = 500 steps, corresponding to about 10 years of time.
Choosing ρ = 0.01 (left) yields a phase transition in the number of passive supporters
and a sudden growth of the number of active terrorists, while choosing ρ = 0.001
(right) yields no phase transition. While in both cases the number of passive supporters
increases directly from the start to a level, which is slightly decreasing for one third
of the time, the higher value of the capturing rate triggers the mean field process to
produce enough passive supporters to lift the local process to an overcritical level,
7
Figure 3: Densities of active terrorists and passive supporters on an Erdı¨¿ 12 s-Renyi
random graph G(n, p), p = c/n with n = 200′000 and c = 4, threshold ∆ = 2,
initial density of passive supporters b0 = 0.04, mean field β = 0.00001, in a time span
of t = 500 steps. Choosing ρ = 0.01 (left) yields a phase transition in the number
of passive supporters and a sudden growth of the number of active terrorists, while
choosing ρ = 0.001 (right) yields no phase transition or a phase transition outside of
the time scale under consideration.
where the calamitous phase transition occurs, resulting in an irreversible increase of
active terrorists.
The impact of changing the capturing parameter ρ is shown in Figure 4, on an Erdı¨¿ 12 s&Renyi
random graph G(n, p), p = c/n with n = 50′000 vertices and average degree c = 4,
threshold ∆ = 2, initial density of passive supporters b0 = 0.01, i.e. 500 passive
supporters from the start. The mean field parameter is β = 0.001, i.e. one captured
active terrorist generates 50 passive supporters here. Choosing ρ = 0.004 (left) or
ρ = 0.0025 (right) only alters the moment when the phase transition happens.
Fig 5 shows the simulation run on a sample of the anonymized StudiVz network, in-
cluding members associated with scholars of Bielefeld and their friends. The network
has a size of approximately 400′000 vertices with an average degree of about 7.2, for
more details see [6]. With an initial density of passive supporters of b0 = 0.00005,
corresponding to an average of 20 passive supporters from the start, and with capturing
rate β = 0.0001, corresponding to an average of 40 citizens getting converted to pas-
sive supporters, we observe the phase transition occurring as soon as one or two active
terrorists get caught.
5 Conclusions and Perspectives
The main observation is the existence of a phase transition in the number of passive
supporters of terroristic activities. Whenever counter terrorist activities lead to collat-
eral damages, the likelihood of outraging civilians rises. A high number of passive
supporters provides a steady pool to recruit active terrorists, so the number of active
terrorists and their attacks increases, as fig. 1 suggests and as resembled by the graph
for the number of active terrorists in figures 3, 4 and 5.
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Figure 4: Densities of active terrorists and passive supporters on an Erdı¨¿ 12 s-Renyi
random graph G(n, p), p = c/n with n = 50′000 and c = 4, threshold ∆ = 2,
initial density of passive supporters b0 = 0.01, mean field β = 0.001, in a time span
of t = 1500 steps. Choosing ρ = 0.004 (left) or ρ = 0.0025 (right) only alters the
moment when the phase transition happens.
Figure 5: Densities of active terrorists and passive supporters on a sample of the
StudiVz network. The threshold is ∆ = 2, initial density of passive supporters
b0 = 0.00005, mean field β = 0.0001, in a time span of t = 500 steps. The phase
transition occurs as soon as one or two active terrorists get captured.
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Our results not only suggest lowering of the rate ρ of removal of active terrorists to
avoid the phase transition. The interplay of the mean field term β, which is the rate
at which removed active terrorists generate passive supporters, and ρ has to be taken
into account. Avoidable failures resulting in casualties, high collateral damage, pic-
tures and videos of humiliated inmates in Allied prisons, are factors which increase
the probability that the civil population will join the terrorist side instead of fighting
against it.
If the Allied forces want to avoid the phase transition in the number of passive support-
ers to not gain a stable number of active terrorist, capturing or removing active terrorists
from the network would make sense therefore only if this happened practically without
casualties, fatalities, applying torture or committing terroristic acts against the local
population.
If this is not possible - and evidence is pointing towards this - our results strongly
indicate that there is no military solution to fight terrorism, so only political solutions
are available, in strict coincidence with former results obtained by Galam, [3],[4].
A refinement of the model may use weighted graphs, where the vertices have properties
like credibility or importance, to include intra-organization dynamics, e.g. to model
the emergence of terror cells. In the same fashion the influence of local warlords and
tribal conflicts may be described. Finally, it will be important to extend the model to
allow studying also the countereffects of the terrorists themselves in case their actions
produce more and more civilian victims.
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